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This study investigates the impact effect of monetary policy shocks on the 
exchange rates of Brazil, Mexico and Chile. We find that even a focus on 1 
day  exchange  rate  changes  following  policy  events  -  which  reduces  the 
potential for reverse causality considerably - fails to lend support for the 
conventional view that associates interest rate hikes with appreciations. This 
lack  of  empirical  backing  for  the  predictions  of  standard  open  economy 
models  that,  for  instance,  combine  the  UIP  condition  with  rational 
expectations (along the lines of Dornbusch (1976)) persists irrespective of 
whether we use the US Dollar or effective exchange rates, whether interest 
rate changes are anticipated or not, whether changes in the policy rate that 
were  followed  by  exchange  rate  intervention  are  excluded  or  whether 
"contaminated" events are dropped from the analysis. We argue that it is 
difficult  to  attribute  this  stronger  version  of  the  exchange  rate  puzzle  to 
fiscal dominance, as similar results are obtained in the case of Chile - a 
country that has had the highest possible short-term credit rating since 1997 
and a debt/GDP ratio below 10%. Indeed, in Chile a 100 b.p. hike leads to a 
2.2 to 2.6% devaluation of the Peso on impact. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The extent to which monetary factors determine the value of a currency has been 
one of the key questions of macroeconomics for a long time. While an extensive list of 
studies has addressed this question and the associated puzzles in the case of developed 
countries, the literature that looks at this issue in the context of emerging markets is much 
more scant, in part because most emerging markets do not have a sufficiently long track 
record with a floating exchange rate regime. As the number of emerging economies that let 
the value of its currency be driven by market forces has increased, and the value of the 
currencies of these increasingly important players in the global economy has come to the 
forefront  of  the  international  policy  debate,  the  need  of  a  clearer  understanding  of  the 
determinants of the value of their currencies has raised the necessity of such analysis.
1 At 
the  very  least,  some  knowledge  about  the  actual  relationship  between  interest  rate  and 
exchange rate movements in emerging economies is required to guide model selection in 
the context of emerging markets and provide a clearer understanding of the transmission 
mechanisms that are at work. 
Conventional  open  economy  models  that  combine  an  uncovered  interest  parity 
condition with rational expectations, along the lines of the seminal paper by Dornbusch 
(1976),  would  suggest  that  an  unexpected  monetary  contraction  leads  to  an  immediate 
appreciation of the currency, so as to create the conditions for a subsequent depreciation at 
                                                           
1 The recent strength of the Brazilian Real (at the time of this writing the BRL was trading at a 12 year high 
against the USD even in nominal terms), for instance, has often been attributed to the fact that the domestic 
interest rate in Brazil has been high by international standards. a rate that equals the interest rate differential. Identifying the effects of monetary policy 
shocks  on  exchange  rates  in  the  data  however  is not  a trivial  task if  one  takes  proper 
account  of  the  issue  of  endogeneity,  i.e.  the  possibility  that  monetary  policy  actions 
constitute  a  reaction  to  concomitant  changes  in  the  exchange  rate  or  foreign  monetary 
policy policy conditions. In fact, a study by Zettelmeyer (2004) argues that the frequent 
association of positive interest rate shocks with currency depreciations - which is a well 
known feature of the VAR  literature (see Grili and Roubini (1995)) - can be attributed to 
this problem of reverse causality. In order to control for this possibility, this paper follows 
the approach taken by that author, to study the impact effect of a total of 238 monetary 
policy committee decisions on the exchange rates of the Brazilian Real, the Mexican and 
the Chilean Peso using daily variations. In contrast to Zettelmeyer, however, we do not 
restrict our study to monetary policy decisions that led to changes in the policy rate (as 
decisions to hold may also have a surprise component) and do not include periods in which 
the central banks responded to exchange rates in an explicit way. 
The  main  advantage  of  the event based  methodology  is  that  our  results  are  not 
model dependent and, in particular, do not rely on VAR based identification of monetary 
policy shocks and the strong information assumptions that underlie it. Note that VAR based 
procedures require the strong assumption that the information set of the central bank is fully 
described by the variables contained in the system. The caveat of our approach is that we 
are unable to draw any conclusion about the dynamic response of the exchange rate to 
monetary policy shocks. The focus on the cases of Brazil, Mexico and Chile allows us to 
compare the effects of monetary policy in emerging economies that have had a floating 
exchange rate regime in place for more than a decade but have had markedly different 
levels of gross indebtness. 
Contrary to the results that were obtained for a number of developed economies,
2  
the analysis of the events that surrounded the (pre-scheduled) monetary policy committee 
meetings that took place in Brazil, Mexico and Chile between January 2003 and May 2011 
fails  to  provide  evidence  that  interest  rate  increases  are  associated  with  exchange  rate 
                                                           
2 Kearns and Manners (2006) and Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright (2007) also find the textbook association 
of monetary contractions with currency appreciations for a selection of advanced economies. appreciations on impact in any of these three countries. This observation holds irrespective 
of whether interest rate changes are anticipated or not or of whether changes in the policy 
rate that were followed by exchange rate intervention are excluded from the sample. If 
anything,  we  find  that  the  exchange  rate  depreciates  following  monetary  policy 
contractions, irrespective of whether we use changes in the US Dollar rate or the variation 
against a basket of currencies. This apparently puzzling finding is not easily attributed to 
fiscal dominance, as such results hold not only in the case of Brazil or Mexico, but also in 
the case of Chile - a country that has the highest possible short-term sovereign credit rating 
since 1997 and a debt/GDP ratio below 10%. Indeed, in the case of Chile we find that a 100 
b.p.  hike  leads  to  a  2.2  to  2.6%  depreciation  of  the  Peso  on  impact,  a  result  that  is 
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. The empirical failure of the impact UIP 
in  these  emerging  markets  represents  a  higher  frequency  version  of  the  exchange  rate 
puzzle that is typical of the VAR literature. 
Relation to the literature. One paper that finds results that are similar to the ones 
reported here is that of Kraay (2003), who fails to find any indication that higher interest 
rates defend exchange rates that come under attack. However, their sample is restricted to 
periods of crises. In terms of theory, a number of models have weakened or even reversed 
the link between interest rate hikes and currency appreciations. In Aghion, Bacchetta and 
Banerjee’s (2000, 2001) model with credit constraints, for instance, there is the possibility 
that an increase in interest rates could lead to exchange rate depreciation for a certain range 
of  parameters.  This  possibility  arises  because  higher  domestic  interest  rates  diminish 
investment  and  future  output,  reducing  future  demand  for  money  --  which  implies  a 
currency depreciation. On the other hand, Blanchard (2005) and Gonçalves and Guimarães 
(2011) develop fiscal dominance models in which high indebtness levels can lead to an 
inverted  relationship  between  interest  and  exchange  rates.  More  recently,  disaster  risk 
models, along the lines of Guo (2007), Farhi and Gabaix (2008) and Gourio, Siemer and 
Verdelhan (2010), have delivered a negative association between interest rates and currency 
values, replicating the failure of UIP. However, in these models, this is the result of a shock 
to disaster probability or to the resilience of a country, rather than to monetary policy itself. To the extent that the exchange rate does not react to domestic monetary policy in 
the way that conventional theory and standard open economy DSGE models would suggest, 
the results of this paper are also related to the exchange rate disconnect puzzle. Moore and 
Roche (2010) provide an explanation to the exchange rate disconnect puzzle and the failure 
of UIP based on habit persistence, in a paper that is closely related to Verdelhan (2010). 
Finally, Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2008) point out that carry trade would push the 
reaction of the exchange rate after an interest rate shock toward the one that is predicted by 
UIP.  Slow  adjustment  could  be  due  to  liquidity  constraints.  However,  their  rationale 
suggests an initial under-reaction to a shock, rather than the reverse reaction that we find. 
The  same  holds  for  the  infrequent  portfolio  adjustment  theory  of  Bacchetta  and  van 
Wincoop (2010). 
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  II  explains  the  country  selection  and 
provides  some  background  information  on  the  policy  framework.  In  Section  III,  a 
preliminary scatter plot  analysis is presented. Section  IV  explains the estimates for the 
baseline models. A comprehensive classification of the policy events according to their 
inputted degree of exogeneity and re-estimation of the specifications of the previous section 
is  performed  in  Section  V,  where  we  analyze  subsamples  according  to  the  degrees  of 
exogeneity of the observations. As a robustness check, the estimations are repeated based 
on the variations against a weighted basket of global currencies. The paper closes with 
some concluding remarks, indicating possible directions for further research. 
 
2.  Methodology 
 
The paper analyzes the impact of monetary policy by focusing on three emerging 
economies  that  have  an  established  floating  exchange  rate  regime:  Brazil,  Mexico  and 
Chile. We consider the exchange rate regimes of these countries as established because they 
have been in place in an uninterrupted fashion for longer than 10 years according to the de 
facto  classification  of  Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2004)  and  later  updates  of  it  by  the  IMF. 
Emerging economies that fall into this category typically have a higher nominal exchange rate volatility than that of the United States and the Eurozone, even though they practice a 
managed float.
3 All three countries have also been operating within an inflation targeting 
framework for more than a decade (see Gonçalves and Salles (2008)) and use a short-term 
interest rate as their main policy instrument. Besides the fact that they are important Latin 
American economies for which we could obtain daily foreign exchange intervention data, 
the  selection  also  rested  on  the  observation  that  the  decision  of  the  monetary  policy 
committee meetings in these countries is announced after markets have already closed: in 
the case of the Banco Central do Brasil and Banco Central de Chile, in the evening of the 
last day of the meeting and, in the case of Banco de Mexico, on the following morning, at 
9:30  a.m.,  before  the  opening  of  markets.
4  We  considered  the  pre-scheduled  monetary 
policy committee meetings in these countries that took place between January 2003 and 
May 2011. This gave us a total of 238 policy events for which we could analyze the market 
developments on the day that followed the policy decision (79 in Brazil, 101 in Mexico and 
58  in  Chile).  To  consider  the  surprise  component  of  the  decisions  we  examined  how 
immediate changes in market interest rates relate to changes in the nominal exchange rates. 
 
3.  Scatter Plots 
 
Figure 1 shows the scatter plots of exchange rate and market interest rate variations 
for each of the countries. The plots on the left represent changes in the US Dollar exchange 
rate  against  changes  in  the  90  day  interest  rate  swaps  on  the  days  that  followed  the 
monetary policy committee meetings. In the case of Mexico we used the 28 day interbank 
rate as a continuous daily series for the equivalent 90 day rate was not available.
5 The plots 
on the right are based on the actual changes in the targeted policy rate.
6 The visual analysis 
                                                           
3 See Kohlscheen (2010). 
4 In the case of the Reserve Bank of South Africa, in contrast, the announcement is made at 3:00 p.m. on the 
last day of the meetings, while markets are still open. 
5 We do not use government bills as the issuance of these has not been continuous. DI x pré swap contracts 
are guaranteed by the futures exchange (BM&FBovespa) and effectively replicate a zero-coupon bond. 
6 Note that in Mexico the 1 day interbank rate only became the main policy instrument in January 2008, which 
explains the smaller sample size in this case. Prior to that, the monetary policy committee used to announce a 
quantitative target (the corto). suggests no clear relation between the variables in the case of Brazil and Mexico and a 
positive  relation  in  Chile  -  i.e.  an  association  of  interest  rate  increases  with  currency 
devaluations. 
Figure 2 repeats the scatter plots separating the observations according to whether 
the observations occurred on a day in which the central bank intervened in the foreign 
exchange market or not. It is interesting to note that, if anything, the relationship becomes 
even more positive in the sample without intervention. On the other hand, the intervention 
subsamples suggest a slightly negative relationship (as would be predicted by theory).  
 
4.  Regression Analysis 
 
To assess the impact effect of monetary policy on the exchange rates we estimated 
∆et=α+β∆in,t+γ∆Zt+εt 
for each country, where ∆et is the daily variation in the exchange rate, ∆in,t represents the 
change in the n-month interest rate and ∆Zt stands for the change in eventual additional 
control variables on the day of the policy announcement - or the day after, if the policy 
announcement was made after market closure. α captures the eventual trend depreciation 
over the sample period. The parameter of interest in this paper is β: if the usual Dornbusch 
type  combination  of  uncovered  interest  parity  and  rational  expectations  were  a  good 
approximation of reality, β would be negative and statistically significant, meaning that a 
surprise monetary tightening would lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate. 
As already noted, the focus on the variation within a single day diminishes the 
potential that a problem of reverse causality may drive the estimation results. As we are 
focusing on the day following the policy announcement, the variation in the market interest 
rate should normally be dominated by the news regarding the monetary policy decision. 
Note that et and in,t are asset prices that should react to news instantaneously as long as 
markets are liquid. We use either a 1-month or a 3-month interest rate as the market for these  instruments  is  sufficiently  liquid  and  changes  in  short-term  rates  will  reflect  the 
surprise element in the new policy rate. Obviously, the market interest rate will also reflect 
other developments that affected the money market within the same day, so that we cannot 
rule out the possibility of endogeneity completely. This led us to re-estimate the above 
equation using the actual change in the policy target as an instrument. While the change in 
the targeted policy rate is unlikely to be correlated with non-policy factors that could have 
affected the 1 or the 3 month rate on the first opening day of markets, it is clearly correlated 
with the change in these rates.
7 The Durbin and the Wu-Hausman test statistics clearly did 
not reject the null of exogeneity of the regressors in the cases of Brazil and Mexico for all 
specifications, backing the use of standard L.S. over I.V. This was not the case in Chile, 
where we report the results of the I.V. estimations instead.
8 
The  first  column  in  Table  1  shows  the  estimation  output  when  no  controls  are 
included (as in the baseline case of Zettelmeyer), whereas the second column repeats the 
exercise  including  controls.  The  controls  in Zt  intend  to  capture  the  changes  in  three 
factors: foreign monetary conditions, risk premia and international commodity prices. The 
change in the foreign monetary conditions is measured by the daily variation of the 3 month 
T-Bill rate - which is comparable to the 90 day swap rates in the cases of Brazil and Chile,
9 
whereas in the case of Mexico we use the change in the 1 month US Dollar LIBOR rate to 
compare with the change in the 28 day interbank rate. The change in the country specific 
risk premium is proxied by the daily change in the VIX rate, as the strong correlation of the 
VIX with changes in sovereign credit default spreads has been documented earlier (see Pan 
and Singleton (2008)).
10 Indeed, the change in the VIX rate turns out to be highly correlated 
with  the  daily  change in  the  5  year CDS  spreads  also  within  our sample  period.  (The 
correlation over the sample period was 0.584 for Brazil, 0.702 for Mexico and 0.708 for 
Chile.) Using the CDS spread directly to capture the risk premium would have the potential 
of compounding the problem of reverse causality - which previous authors have pointed out 
                                                           
7 For our sample of policy events, the correlation is 0.395 for Brazil, 0.621 for Mexico and 0.761 for Chile. 
8 Note that, since the models are not overidentified, the Sargan-Hansen test does not apply. 
9 In the Chilean case the daily series starts in May 2006, which is why we focus on the policy events that took 
place after this date. 
10 The VIX index is a measure of equity market volatility that is computed by the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange. as being the culprit for the association of interest rate hikes with depreciations. While in 
principle the exchange rate variation could have a direct effect on the CDS spread within 
the same day, it is highly unlikely that the exchange rates of any of these countries drive the 
VIX spread. In any case, as a robustness check, we re-ran the regressions using the CDS 
instead and report them in Table A1 in the Appendix. The pattern of the results that we 
report for the β estimates is not greatly affected by this change in proxy. Note however that 
the substitution of the VIX rate by the CDS causes the control for the foreign monetary 
conditions to attain the wrong sign in the case of Chile, with high statistical significance. 
Finally, the change in international commodity prices, is measured by the daily variation in 
the  CRB  index,  a  commodity  price  index  that  is  calculated  on  a  daily  basis  by  the 
Commodity Research Bureau. 
The third and the fourth columns in Table 1 repeat the estimations restricting the 
subsample  to  the  days  in  which  the  respective  Central  Banks  did  not  intervene  in  the 
foreign exchange market. Throughout, our control variables do attain the expected sign 
wherever they turn out to be statistically significant. Increases in international interest rates, 
in the VIX rate and decreases in international commodity prices lead to depreciations of the 
currencies. The effect of the foreign interest rate however is only statistically significant at 
5% in the case of Mexico. The reduction in risk appetite, proxied by the increase in the VIX 
rate, leads to significant depreciations in the Brazilian and the Chilean currencies. Finally, 
increases in commodity prices lead to very significant appreciations of the Chilean Peso, as 
one would expect. The fit of the regressions led us to adopt the version with the control 
variables as the baseline specification in the remainder of this paper. 
As for our main variable of interest, β, we never manage to attain anything close to 
the negative sign predicted by theory in a way that is significant. On the contrary, the point 
estimates indicate that an unexpected monetary tightening that leads to a 100 b.p. increase 
in the 90 day DI swap rate would lead to a modest 0.5-1.2% depreciation of the Brazilian 
Real on impact. In the case of Mexico, a hike that causes a 100 b.p. increase in the 28 day 
TIIE rate, would lead only to marginal variations in the value of the Peso. Based on the 
robust standard errors, neither effect differs significantly from zero. The estimates for Chile 
are the most surprising ones: our point estimates suggest that a tightening of 100 b.p. in the tasa de politica monetaria would lead to a 2.2 to 2.5% depreciation of the Chilean Peso. 
This effect is always significant at the 1% confidence level.
11 Indeed, this suggests that the 
positive slope that was apparent in the scatter plots is not accidental. The Chilean case is 
very telling because it would seem to invalidate attributing the failure to find an association 
of interest rate hikes with currency appreciations in emerging markets to a problem of fiscal 
dominance in a generalized way. Chile has had the highest possible short-term sovereign 
credit rating at Standard & Poor's since 1997 and its debt/GDP ratio of 8% is one of the 
lowest in the world. 
Summing  up,  we  fail  to  find  the  link  of  interest  rate  hikes  with  currency 
appreciations or any evidence that would square with the prediction of standard rational 
expectations models that are based on the UIP when looking at impact effects. In particular, 
note that, if anything, dropping all events in which the monetary authorities intervened in 
the foreign exchange market on the day that followed the policy meeting moves us even 
further away from the negative coefficient that one would have expected. 
 
5.  Robustness 
 
    To assess the robustness of the findings of the previous Section, we proceed to analyze 
first  whether  the  results  persist  once  we  drop  "contaminated  events"  -  following  the 
narrative approach of Zettelmeyer (2004) - and, second, whether results change if effective 
exchange rate variations are used instead of bilateral variations. 
 
5.1. Exogeneity Classes 
Zettelmeyer observed that a researcher may fail to find evidence in favor of the UIP 
condition because of data contamination. In our setting, this could occur because market 
                                                           
11 βs are also positive and significant under OLS, when the variation in the 90 day swap rate is used. The 
Durbin and the Wu-Hausman tests however reject the null hypothesis that regressors are exogenous in this 
specification. interest rates may react to other changes, besides the changes in the policy rate, within the 
day that follows the policy announcement. For this reason, we scrutinized the news that 
surrounded all pre-scheduled monetary policy committee meetings of this study. We did 
this by analyzing all country news that were made public by Bloomberg between the time 
of the policy announcement and the following market closure. The cover pages of major 
newspapers on the days that followed the monetary policy committee meetings were also 
analyzed. In the case of Brazil we used the archives of Folha de São Paulo, while in the 
case of Mexico the archives of El Universal were used. Both newspapers typically give 
ample coverage to monetary policy decisions. For the case of Chile, we used Bloomberg 
additionally  to  search  for  major  global  events  that  may  have  affected  the  local  money 
market on the days that followed the monetary policy decisions. 
The overall strategy  was to highlight any data  release that was related either to 
GDP,  inflation  or  unemployment, as  well  as  reports  concerning  the  state of  the  global 
economy and other measures that clearly could have had an economic impact that appeared 
in the media outlets mentioned above. We identified that 21.8% of the policy events could 
suffer from potential contamination in the case of Brazil, 22.7% in the case of Mexico and 
20.7% in the case of Chile. Each of the policy events was then classified according to 
whether there were other news that may have affected the money market on that particular 
date. We considered that the release of GDP and CPI data represented the highest degree of 
contamination, because of their importance within an inflation targeting framework, and 
classified the events that coincided with such releases as being of the exogeneity class C. 
Changes to the minimum wage - which clearly have strong fiscal implications in the case of 
Brazil - as well as events in the international economy that made it to the front page of the 
major national newspapers, as for instance the Lehman Brothers incident or the slashing of 
the Fed Funds rate in October 2008 where also put into this class. We considered that the 
publication  of  unemployment  statistics  represented  a  lower  degree  of  contamination, 
assigning it an exogeneity classification B, due to the lower weight that this variable has in 
economies where only a part of the labor market is formal.
12 The remaining policy events, 
which had no overlap with other significant economic news, were assigned to exogeneity 
                                                           
12 In Brazil, for instance, only 51% of current employment relations are formal. class A. The complete list of the meetings and their classification can be seen in Tables 2 to 
4. 
Table 5 lists the regression outputs for the cases were contaminated observations are 
dropped from the sample. We report the results for the cases in which only observations of 
the exogeneity class C were dropped as well as results for when we dropped both, classes B 
and C. By and large, it is apparent that the results repeat those reported in Table 1 quite 
closely.  In  particular,  in  the  case  of  Chile,  the  association  of  interest  rate  hikes  with 
depreciations of the Peso remains significant at the 1% confidence level throughout and the 
point estimates remain largely unaffected.
13 On the whole, we do not find an association 
between interest rate hikes and appreciations even if we restrict our sample to contain only 
the observations of exogeneity class A. Indeed, we did not find such association even when 
we additionally dropped the observations that were associated with market volatility, i.e. 
the observations in which either the VIX rate, the CDS spread or the CRB index varied by 
more than a percentage point in absolute terms. 
 
5.2 Effective Exchange Rates 
Another  possibility  is  that  the  above  failure  to  find  evidence  in  favor  of  the 
conventional view is that so far we have looked exclusively at the bilateral exchange rates 
against the US Dollar. To investigate whether this is the case, we checked whether results 
change when effective exchange rates are used as dependent variables instead. For this 
purpose, the daily variation of the national currencies against baskets of currencies was 
considered. Table 6 reports the test results when the basket included the US Dollar, the 
Euro, the Japanese Yen and the British Pound (which are the four currencies with highest 
turnover according to the Triennal Bank Survey of the Bank of International Settlements). 
The weight of each currency was calculated based on the share of total trade flows of each 
                                                           
13 Note that the two events with the highest variations in the CLP/USD rate were classified as C, as they were 
associated with the announcements of intervention programs. country with the respective currency areas during the 3 year period that ended in 2002.
14 
The estimates of β change surprisingly little when compared to the estimates that are based 
on the US Dollar exchange rates. In Chile, a 100 b.p. increase in the base rate now leads to 
a 2.3 to 2.6% depreciation of the Peso in effective terms - a result that continues to be 
significant at the 1% confidence level and is practically identical to that obtained based on 
bilateral rates. The overall fit however is worse when effective rates are used, as the RMSE 
statistic increases relative to the US Dollar based results in all 18 specifications of the table. 
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The failure to find the association that Zettelmeyer (2004) and others have found for 
developed countries leads us to conclude that in the context of these emerging economies 
there  is  no  indication  that  the  exchange  rate  puzzle  that  is  characteristic  of  the  VAR 
literature is due to reverse causality or even fiscal dominance. When analyzing the time 
variation of β by using rolling window estimations we also did not find any evidence that 
the point estimates or significance of the coefficient changed in a noticeable way after the 
global financial crisis. In face of this, what we have in these countries may be a stronger 
version of the exchange rate puzzle. It is clear that the link between interest and exchange 
rate variations seems to be much more elusive than what conventional theory and standard 
open economy models would suggest. Addressing this apparent failure of the exchange rate 
predictions of the usual UIP cum rational expectations paradigm would certainly enhance 
the  understanding of  international  capital  flows.  One  conjecture  that  could  be  explored 
further is that the level of activity in the more immediate future and changes in global risk 
aversion  are  the  dominant  factors  when  it  comes  to  currency  valuations  in  emerging 
economies. 
 
                                                           
14 In the case of the 4 currency basket, for instance, the weights in the basket are 0.4366 for the US Dollar, 
0.4336 for the Euro, 0.0817 for the Yen and 0.0481 for the Pound in the case of Brazil, 0.3436, 0.3280, 
0.2236 and 0.1049, respectively, for Chile and 0.8950, 0.0674, 0.0307 and 0.0069, respectively, for Mexico. References 
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Data Sources 
    The 3 month T-Bill and the 1 month US Dollar LIBOR rates were obtained from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, whereas the VIX, CDS spreads and the CRB index were 
obtained through Bloomberg. Bilateral trade flows were taken from the IMF's Direction of 
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19Table 1
The Impact of Monetary Policy on the Exchange Rate 
Brazil 
D.V.: Change in BRL/USD rate           Full Sample        No Intervention
L.S. L.S. L.S. L.S.
d (DI 90) 0.508 0.898 1.039 1.175
0.700 0.741 1.082 1.081
d (3 month T Bill) -2.386 -0.564
1.713 3.008
d (VIX) 0.145* 0.170*
0.069 0.102
d (price of commodities) -0.126 0.061
0.256 0.235
no. of observations 79 79 39 39
R2 0.008 0.076 0.048 0.123
RMSE 0.922 0.908 0.796 0.797
F / chi2 0.53 3.80** 0.92 3.73*
Durbin score (chi 2) 0.963 0.982 0.281 0.337
Wu-Hausman (F) 0.955 0.958 0.255 0.287
Mexico
D.V.: Change in MXP/USD rate           Full Sample        No Intervention
L.S. L.S. L.S. L.S.
d (TIIE 28) -0.435 -0.451 0.576 0.586
0.681 0.683 1.253 1.323
d (1 m USD LIBOR) 1.323* 1.357*
0.658 0.562
d (VIX) 0.014 -0.014
0.072 0.096
d (price of commodities) -0.177 -0.137
0.153 0.478
no. of observations 101 101 28 28
R2 0.002 0.072 0.002 0.093
RMSE 0.602 0.590 0.854 0.866
F / chi2 0.41 1.27 0.21 1.85
Durbin score (chi 2) 0.047 0.043 small N small N
Wu-Hausman (F) 0.044 0.036 small N small N
Chile
D.V.: Change in CLP/USD rate           Full Sample        No Intervention
I.V. I.V. I.V. I.V.
d (swap 90) 2.258** 2.206** 2.428** 2.296**
0.445 0.439 0.428 0.443
d (3 month T Bill) -2.592 -3.999
2.591 2.797
d (VIX) 0.200* 0.185
†
0.089 0.096
d (price of commodities) -0.493** -0.377*
0.170 0.170
no. of observations 58 58 48 48
R2 0.004 0.434 0.038 0.469
RMSE 1.034 0.764 1.031 0.766
F / chi2 25.79** 49.33** 32.17** 46.22**
Durbin score (chi 2) 7.961** 7.184** 5.235* 5.871*
Wu-Hausman (F) 3.138
† 4.707* 2.252 3.619
†
Note: Robust standard errors. †, * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
confidence levels, respectively.
20Table 2
BCB Monetary Policy Meetings
Meeting  Exogeneity class Intervention Event ∆DI90 (b.p.) ∆e (BRL/USD)
22/01/2003 A 0 30 -0.818
19/02/2003 A 0 -10 0.367
19/03/2003 A 0 11 0.735
23/04/2003 A 0 9 -0.391
21/05/2003 A 0 6 -0.887
18/06/2003 A 0 -3 0.107
23/07/2003 A 0 -8 0.287
20/08/2003 A 0 -1 0.073
17/09/2003 A 0 -16 -0.282
22/10/2003 A 0 6 0.336
19/11/2003 A 0 -58 -0.092
17/12/2003 A 0 4 -0.136
21/01/2004 A 1 47 0.000
18/02/2004 A 0 11 0.727
17/03/2004 A 0 -12 0.224
14/04/2004 A 0 4 0.373
19/05/2004 A 0 47 2.428
16/06/2004 C 0 Government defeat in Senate raises minimum wage 5 -0.398
21/07/2004 B 0 Unemployment statistics released 0 0.479
18/08/2004 A 0 -2 -0.431
15/09/2004 A 0 -7 -0.516
20/10/2004 A 0 27 -1.082
17/11/2004 A 0 13 -0.257
15/12/2004 A 1 17 -0.782
19/01/2005 A 0 14 0.136
16/02/2005 A 0 -5 -0.729
16/03/2005 A 0 32 -0.174
20/04/2005 A 0 11 -0.987
18/05/2005 A 0 15 -0.723
15/06/2005 A 0 -5 -1.202
20/07/2005 A 0 1 -0.497
17/08/2005 C 0 Government overturns minimum wage 13 0.617
14/09/2005 A 0 1 -1.236
19/10/2005 A 1 -25 -0.408
23/11/2005 B 1 Unemployment statistics released 2 -0.045
14/12/2005 A 1 1 0.781
18/01/2006 A 1 -18 -0.219
08/03/2006 A 1 -8 -0.748
19/04/2006 A 1 2 0.440
31/05/2006 A 0 -16 -1.269
(continues on next page)
21Table 2 (continuation)
BCB Monetary Policy Meetings
Meeting  Exogeneity class Intervention Event ∆DI90 (b.p.) ∆e (BRL/USD)
31/05/2006 A 0 -16 -1.269
19/07/2006 A 1 -4 0.390
30/08/2006 C 0 GDP statistics released -20 0.272
18/10/2006 A 1 -8 0.225
29/11/2006 C 1 GDP statistics released -11 -0.528
24/01/2007 A 0 0 -0.023
07/03/2007 A 1 1 -0.317
18/04/2007 A 1 -4 -0.260
06/06/2007 A 1 -15 0.107
18/07/2007 A 1 -2 -0.392
05/09/2007 A 0 2 -0.484
17/10/2007 A 1 -44 -0.369
05/12/2007 A 1 1 -0.462
23/01/2008 B 1 Unemployment statistics released 4 -1.455
05/03/2008 A 1 -6 0.120
16/04/2008 A 1 17 -0.665
04/06/2008 A 1 -2 -0.276
23/07/2008 A 1 -24 -0.335
10/09/2008 C 0 GDP statistics released & Lehman Brothers incident 10 2.223
29/10/2008 C 0 Fed Funds rate slashed to 1% & $ 30 bn credit line from Fed 11 -0.793
10/12/2008 B 1 Income tax reduction 1 -5.210
21/01/2009 A 1 -17 -1.041
11/03/2009 A 0 -12 -0.890
29/04/2009 A 0 -3 -0.252
10/06/2009 A 1 -31 -0.888
22/07/2009 B 1 Unemployment statistics released 4 -0.562
02/09/2009 A 1 2 -1.765
21/10/2009 B 1 Unemployment statistics released -3 -0.780
09/12/2009 C 1 GDP statistics released  -3 0.091
27/01/2010 A 1 -5 0.254
17/03/2010 A 1 -15 1.179
28/04/2010 A 1 9 -1.350
09/06/2010 A 1 3 -1.292
21/07/2010 B 1 Unemployment statistics released -9 -0.771
01/09/2010 A 1 -2 -0.424
20/10/2010 B 1 Unemployment statistics released 1 0.968
08/12/2010 C 1 GDP statistics released  -14 0.781
19/01/2011 A 1 -2 0.006
02/03/2011 C 1 GDP statistics released  -1 -0.391
20/04/2011 A 1 -2 -0.013
22Table 3
Banxico Monetary Policy Meetings
Meeting  Exogeneity class Intervention Event ∆TIIE28 (b.p.) ∆e (MXP/USD)
10/01/2003 A 0 6 0.538
24/01/2003 A 0 -8 0.519
07/02/2003 C 0 CPI statistics released -9 0.228
21/02/2003 C 0 GDP statistics released -3 0.734
28/03/2003 A 0 -7 -0.904
25/04/2003 A 0 -35 -0.029
23/05/2003 A 1 -23 0.088
27/06/2003 A 1 -13 -0.603
25/07/2003 A 1 -7 -0.103
22/08/2003 A 1 -9 0.100
26/09/2003 A 1 -6 1.070
24/10/2003 A 1 -10 -0.023
21/11/2003 A 1 2 -0.032
11/12/2003 C 1 Ortiz wins 2nd term as central bank governor 7 -0.239
23/01/2004 A 1 8 -0.356
20/02/2004 A 1 0 -0.242
12/03/2004 C 1 Central Bank announces change in daily USD auctions -3 0.005
26/03/2004 A 1 -15 0.407
23/04/2004 A 1 -5 0.156
27/04/2004 A 1 -15 0.202
28/05/2004 C 1 Bilateral treaty with Mercosur announced 2 -0.338
25/06/2004 A 1 -5 0.151
23/07/2004 A 1 -2 -0.107
27/08/2004 A 1 -4 0.070
24/09/2004 A 1 -3 -0.064
22/10/2004 A 1 1 -0.260
26/11/2004 A 1 -3 -0.216
10/12/2004 A 1 1 0.383
28/01/2005 A 1 2 -0.335
25/02/2005 A 1 -2 0.118
23/03/2005 A 1 4 0.542
22/04/2005 A 1 1 -0.044
27/05/2005 B 1 Unemployment statistics released 1 -0.561
24/06/2005 B 1 Unemployment statistics released -2 -0.236
22/07/2005 A 1 -3 0.345
26/08/2005 A 1 0 0.166
23/09/2005 A 1 -2 0.124
28/10/2005 A 1 -2 -0.591
25/11/2005 A 1 -1 -0.012
09/12/2005 A 1 2 1.162
27/01/2006 A 1 -3 -0.420
24/02/2006 A 1 0 -0.118
24/03/2006 A 1 -1 -0.041
21/04/2006 A 1 0 0.331
26/05/2006 A 1 -1 -0.646
23/06/2006 A 1 1 -0.020
28/07/2006 A 1 0 -0.019
25/08/2006 A 1 -1 0.282
22/09/2006 A 1 0 0.840
27/10/2006 A 1 0 -0.205
23Table 3 (continuation)
Banxico Monetary Policy Meetings
Meeting  Exogeneity class Intervention Event ∆TIIE28 (b.p.) ∆e (MXP/USD)
24/11/2006 A 1 1 0.511
08/12/2006 C 1 Calderon presents first budget proposal 0 0.044
26/01/2007 A 1 0 0.591
23/02/2007 A 1 0 0.651
23/03/2007 A 1 1 -0.049
27/04/2007 A 1 0 -0.006
25/05/2007 A 1 0 -0.509
22/06/2007 A 1 0 -0.172
27/07/2007 A 1 0 0.491
24/08/2007 B 1 Unemployment statistics released 0 -0.069
21/09/2007 B 1 Unemployment statistics released -1 -0.155
26/10/2007 A 1 0 -0.709
23/11/2007 A 1 0 -0.052
07/12/2007 C 1 CPI statistics released -2 -0.221
18/01/2008 A 1 -1 -0.192
15/02/2008 B 1 Bombs near Mexico City police station 0 0.223
14/03/2008 A 1 -3 -0.153
18/04/2008 B 1 Unemployment statistics released 1 -0.208
16/05/2008 A 1 2 -0.480
20/06/2008 B 1 Unemployment statistics released 2 -0.391
18/07/2008 B 1 Unemployment statistics released -2 -0.258
15/08/2008 A 0 -2 0.374
19/09/2008 C 0 US financial measures & Unemployment statistics  0 -2.060
17/10/2008 A 0 -1 -1.652
28/11/2008 A 0 0 0.680
16/01/2009 A 0 -3 -2.204
20/02/2009 C 1 GDP statistics released -4 1.827
20/03/2009 A 1 -6 0.483
17/04/2009 C 1 IMF unveils $47 bn flexible credit line to Mexico -6 0.802
15/05/2009 B 1 Unemployment statistics released -6 -0.696
19/06/2009 A 1 -2 -0.334
17/07/2009 A 1 2 -1.454
21/08/2009 C 1 GDP statistics released -1 -0.393
18/09/2009 A 1 -1 0.085
16/10/2009 A 0 -3 0.132
27/11/2009 A 0 1 -0.260
15/01/2010 A 0 0 -0.377
19/02/2010 A 0 2 -0.082
19/03/2010 A 0 1 0.855
16/04/2010 A 0 1 0.346
21/05/2010 A 0 0 -0.817
18/06/2010 A 0 -2 -0.417
16/07/2010 B 0 Federal police dies in car bombing 1 0.953
20/08/2010 C 0 GDP statistics released 2 0.359
24/09/2010 A 0 -2 -0.736
15/10/2010 A 0 -2 0.141
26/11/2010 A 0 4 0.987
21/01/2011 B 0 Unemployment statistics released 2 -0.348
04/03/2011 A 0 -1 -0.253
15/04/2011 A 0 -3 -0.501
27/05/2011 A 0 1 -0.599
24Table 4
BCCh Monetary Policy Meetings
Meeting  Exogeneity class Intervention Event ∆swap90 (b.p.) ∆e (CLP/USD)
15/06/2006 A 0 0 0.046
13/07/2006 A 0 0 -0.064
10/08/2006 A 0 0 -0.050
07/09/2006 A 0 -1 0.108
12/10/2006 A 0 0 -0.235
16/11/2006 A 0 -3 0.398
14/12/2006 C 0 S&P raises long term foreign currency outlook -3 -0.156
11/01/2007 A 0 -20 0.471
08/02/2007 A 0 0 -0.521
15/03/2007 A 0 1 -0.380
12/04/2007 A 0 3 0.023
10/05/2007 A 0 1 -0.348
14/06/2007 A 0 1 -0.588
12/07/2007 A 0 17 -0.149
09/08/2007 C 0 CBs in US, Eurozone, Japan inject money into banking system 16 0.258
13/09/2007 A 0 -6 0.345
11/10/2007 A 0 -2 0.117
13/11/2007 C 0 7.7 magnitude quake hits northern Chile 0 -0.471
13/12/2007 A 0 21 -0.284
10/01/2008 A 0 31 -1.382
07/02/2008 A 0 -1 -0.890
13/03/2008 A 0 -2 1.197
10/04/2008 C 0 CB announces US Dollars purchase program -3 3.025
08/05/2008 A 1 -1 -0.710
10/06/2008 A 1 31 0.893
10/07/2008 A 1 46 0.380
14/08/2008 A 1 2 0.856
04/09/2008 A 1 5 1.726
09/10/2008 C 0 BCCh extends its US Dollar swaps program to $ 5bn -8 4.431
13/11/2008 B 0 Government workers reject salary offer in national strike -15 -0.437
11/12/2008 A 0 -3 -1.384
08/01/2009 A 0 -40 -1.798
12/02/2009 A 0 -102 -2.390
12/03/2009 A 0 -21 -0.527
09/04/2009 A 0 0 -0.208
07/05/2009 A 0 -18 -0.088
16/06/2009 C 0 CB announces US Dollars sale program 0 -1.611
09/07/2009 A 0 -1 0.320
13/08/2009 A 0 1 0.506
08/09/2009 A 0 1 0.018
13/10/2009 A 0 0 -0.665
12/11/2009 A 0 0 -1.064
15/12/2009 B 0 Formal invitation to join OECD -2 -0.190
14/01/2010 A 0 0 -0.902
11/02/2010 A 0 0 -0.770
18/03/2010 B 0 Chile considers new tax to fund reconstruction 0 0.609
15/04/2010 B 0 Chile considers raising corporate tax by 3% in 2011 1 0.576
13/05/2010 A 0 -20 1.133
15/06/2010 C 0 Senate rejects change to mining royalty bill & Moody's upgrade 23 -0.953
15/07/2010 A 0 4 0.038
12/08/2010 A 0 8 -0.024
16/09/2010 A 0 0 -0.140
14/10/2010 A 0 -7 0.065
15/11/2010 A 0 2 -0.391
16/12/2010 A 0 -10 -0.254
13/01/2011 A 1 -1 -0.102
17/02/2011 A 1 5 -0.238
17/03/2011 C 1 GDP statistics released 45 -1.059
12/04/2011 A 1 9 -0.359
12/05/2011 A 1 23 0.259
25Table 5
The Impact of Monetary Policy on the Exchange Rate - By Classes of Exogeneity
Brazil 
Exogeneity classes                 All          excluding C     excluding B & C
                L.S.                 L.S.                 L.S.
all no interv. all no interv. all no interv.
d (DI 90) 0.898 1.175 0.859 1.093 0.707 1.091
0.741 1.081 0.773 1.150 0.757 1.161
d (3 month T Bill) -2.386 -0.564 -1.590 1.556 -0.121 1.427
1.713 3.008 1.662 2.339 1.477 2.472
d (VIX) 0.145* 0.170* 0.167* 0.230* 0.198** 0.237*
0.069 0.102 0.067 0.100 0.061 0.098
d (price of commodities) -0.126 0.061 -0.162 0.074 0.070 0.135
0.256 0.235 0.273 0.269 0.173 0.273
no. of observations 79 39 70 34 62 33
R2 0.076 0.123 0.077 0.141 0.133 0.161
RMSE 0.908 0.797 0.899 0.723 0.659 0.717
F / chi2 3.80** 3.73* 3.01* 1.91 2.64* 2.23
†
Mexico
Exogeneity classes                 All          excluding C     excluding B & C
                L.S.                 L.S.                 L.S.
all no interv. all no interv. all no interv.
d (TIIE 28) -0.451 0.586 0.034 0.847 -0.019 0.548
0.683 1.323 0.684 1.654 0.682 1.644
d (1 m USD LIBOR) 1.323* 1.357* 1.341* 1.407* 1.373
† 1.433*
0.658 0.562 0.665 0.673 0.697 0.657
d (VIX) 0.014 -0.014 0.011 -0.002 0.013 -0.004
0.072 0.096 0.073 0.092 0.079 0.091
d (price of commodities) -0.177 -0.137 -0.088 0.113 -0.078 0.171
0.153 0.478 0.140 0.495 0.143 0.494
no. of observations 101 28 89 24 78 22
R2 0.072 0.093 0.066 0.127 0.072 0.146
RMSE 0.590 0.866 0.543 0.807 0.558 0.805
F / chi2 1.27 1.85 1.13 1.73 1.08 1.82
Chile
Exogeneity classes                 All          excluding C     excluding B & C
                I.V.                 I.V.                 I.V.
all no interv. all no interv. all no interv.
d (swap 90) 2.206** 2.296** 2.455** 2.401** 2.510** 2.525**
0.439 0.443 0.330 0.290 0.361 0.330
d (3 month T Bill) -2.592 -3.999 -0.896 -2.831 -0.630 -2.556
2.591 2.797 2.941 2.284 2.920 2.197
d (VIX) 0.200* 0.185
† 0.111 0.111 0.161
† 0.181
†
0.089 0.096 0.077 0.086 0.097 0.102
d (price of commodities) -0.493** -0.377* -0.210 -0.102 -0.210 -0.081
0.170 0.170 0.155 0.159 0.150 0.141
no. of observations 58 48 50 41 46 37
R2 0.434 0.469 0.318 0.358 0.330 0.386
RMSE 0.764 0.766 0.589 0.544 0.595 0.539
F / chi2 49.33** 46.22** 76.83** 108.09** 70.86** 99.85**
Note: Robust standard errors are reported. †, * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, 
respectively.
26Table 6
The Impact of Monetary Policy on the Effective Exchange Rate (basket of 4 currencies)
Brazil 
Exogeneity classes                 All          excluding C     excluding B & C
                L.S.                 L.S.                 L.S.
all no interv. all no interv. all no interv.
d (DI 90) 1.049 1.446 0.991 1.394 0.739 1.391
0.804 1.124 0.839 1.189 0.814 1.200
d (3 month T Bill) -2.415 -0.848 -1.259 1.488 0.809 1.354
2.149 3.580 2.112 3.194 1.609 3.273
d (VIX) 0.144
† 0.164
† 0.183* 0.242* 0.214** 0.249*
0.085 0.093 0.085 0.117 0.079 0.114
d (price of commodities) -0.126 0.098 -0.208 0.068 0.113 0.132
0.308 0.250 0.326 0.278 0.194 0.283
no. of observations 79 39 70 34 62 33
R2 0.060 0.126 0.066 0.156 0.126 0.174
RMSE 1.066 0.862 1.064 0.787 0.735 0.782




Exogeneity classes                 All          excluding C     excluding B & C
                L.S.                 L.S.                 L.S.
all no interv. all no interv. all no interv.
d (TIIE 28) -0.366 0.624 0.142 0.890 0.132 0.622
0.680 1.360 0.676 1.707 0.674 1.708
d (1 m USD LIBOR) 1.413* 1.447** 1.431* 1.500* 1.460* 1.525*
0.611 0.513 0.615 0.603 0.647 0.591
d (VIX) 0.010 -0.015 0.009 -0.001 0.011 -0.002
0.074 0.098 0.076 0.094 0.082 0.094
d (price of commodities) -0.196 -0.151 -0.120 0.093 -0.110 0.152 d (price of commodities) -0.196 -0.151 -0.120 0.093 -0.110 0.152
0.154 0.490 0.142 0.516 0.145 0.518
no. of observations 101 28 89 24 78 22
R2 0.080 0.100 0.077 0.131 0.082 0.149
RMSE 0.597 0.890 0.553 0.835 0.568 0.835





Exogeneity classes                 All          excluding C     excluding B & C
                I.V.                 I.V.                 I.V.
all no interv. all no interv. all no interv.
d (swap 90) 2.308** 2.492** 2.485** 2.555** 2.518** 2.638**
0.484 0.522 0.384 0.365 0.410 0.398
d (3 month T Bill) -1.514 -2.630 1.017 -1.268 1.148 -1.056
2.701 2.889 2.847 2.087 2.952 2.321
d (VIX) 0.258** 0.254** 0.172* 0.175* 0.210
† 0.237*
0.085 0.093 0.076 0.082 0.108 0.107





0.192 0.176 0.186 0.174 0.182 0.161
no. of observations 58 48 50 41 46 37
R2 0.471 0.524 0.286 0.358 0.293 0.372
RMSE 0.805 0.791 0.662 0.601 0.665 0.595
F / chi2 45.05** 49.47** 47.40** 59.98** 43.86** 59.46**
Note: Robust standard errors are reported. †, * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, 
respectively.
27Table A1
The Impact of Monetary Policy on the Exchange Rate (CDS)
Brazil 
D.V.: Change in BRL/USD rate           Full Sample        No Intervention
L.S. L.S. L.S. L.S.
d (DI 90) 0.774 0.832 0.987 1.039
0.675 0.647 0.969 0.971
d (3 month T Bill) -2.095 -2.118 0.300 -0.093
1.536 1.655 2.031 2.656
d (CDS) 2.036** 1.856** 1.736** 1.576**
0.524 0.545 0.581 0.492
d (VIX) 0.070 0.086
0.076 0.072
d (price of commodities) -0.194 -0.134 -0.002 0.063
0.213 0.258 0.225 0.240
no. of observations 79 79 39 39
R2 0.155 0.163 0.263 0.280
RMSE 0.868 0.870 0.731 0.733
F / chi2 4.10** 4.78** 4.02** 4.15**
Mexico
D.V.: Change in MXP/USD rate           Full Sample        No Intervention
L.S. L.S. L.S. L.S.
d (TIIE 28) -0.836 -0.087 -0.714 -0.766
0.692 0.715 1.584 1.640
d (1 m USD LIBOR) 1.550** 1.519** 1.608** 1.559**
0.302 0.329 0.233 0.252
d (CDS) 4.817** 4.995** 6.118** 6.324**
0.730 0.883 1.616 1.662
d (VIX) -0.032 -0.050
0.068 0.088
d (price of commodities) 0.012 -0.008 0.435 0.380
0.165 0.134 0.531 0.440
no. of observations 101 101 28 28
R2 0.288 0.293 0.388 0.403
RMSE 0.517 0.517 0.711 0.718
F / chi2 21.94** 28.74** 21.25** 33.65**
Chile
D.V.: Change in CLP/USD rate           Full Sample        No Intervention
I.V. I.V. I.V. I.V.
d (swap 90) 1.705** 1.987** 1.716** 1.988**
0.450 0.492 0.506 0.531
d (3 month T Bill) -4.574* -2.024 -6.053** -3.698
2.111 2.302 2.169 2.383
d (CDS) 7.563* 6.341
† 8.893** 7.656*




d (price of commodities) -0.330
† -0.355* -0.102 -0.149
0.186 0.169 0.170 0.145
no. of observations 58 58 48 48
R2 0.436 0.472 0.486 0.517
RMSE 0.763 0.737 0.754 0.730
F / chi2 59.59** 60.11** 56.88** 57.53**
Note: Robust standard errors. †, * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
confidence levels, respectively.
28Table A2
The Impact of Monetary Policy on the Exchange Rate - By Classes of Exogeneity (CDS)
Brazil 
Exogeneity classes                 All          excluding C     excluding B & C
                L.S.                 L.S.                 L.S.
all no interv. all no interv. all no interv.
d (DI 90) 0.774 0.987 0.708 0.842 0.516 0.835
0.675 0.969 0.669 1.042 0.651 1.060
d (3 month T Bill) -2.095 0.300 -1.317 1.688 -0.052 1.515
1.536 2.031 1.322 1.142 1.010 1.136
d (CDS) 2.036** 1.736** 2.107** 1.797** 1.954** 1.796**
0.524 0.581 0.549 0.498 0.526 0.503
d (price of commodities) -0.194 -0.002 -0.223 0.110 0.024 0.171
0.213 0.225 0.262 0.259 0.186 0.263
no. of observations 79 39 70 34 62 33
R2 0.155 0.263 0.166 0.346 0.244 0.367
F / chi2 4.10** 4.02** 3.88** 3.71* 3.57* 3.47*
Mexico
Exogeneity classes                 All          excluding C     excluding B & C
                L.S.                 L.S.                 L.S.
all no interv. all no interv. all no interv.
d (TIIE 28) -0.836 -0.714 -0.353 -0.502 -0.415 -0.712
0.692 1.584 0.749 2.010 0.753 2.020
d (1 m USD LIBOR) 1.550** 1.608** 1.497** 1.612** 1.497** 1.627**
0.302 0.233 0.354 0.236 0.375 0.235
d (CDS) 4.817** 6.118** 3.669** 5.866* 3.456* 5.552*
0.730 1.616 1.359 2.577 1.539 2.447
d (price of commodities) 0.012 0.435 -0.047 0.356 -0.033 0.399
0.165 0.531 0.181 0.594 0.193 0.588
no. of observations 101 28 89 24 78 22
R2 0.288 0.388 0.127 0.262 0.124 0.278
F / chi2 21.94** 21.25** 5.96** 13.16** 5.11** 13.43**
Chile
Exogeneity classes                 All          excluding C     excluding B & C
                I.V.                 I.V.                 I.V.
all no interv. all no interv. all no interv.
d (swap 90) 1.705** 1.716** 2.169** 1.681** 2.171** 2.011**
0.450 0.506 0.276 0.588 0.274 0.232
d (3 month T Bill) -4.574* -6.053** -2.516 -4.600* -2.684 -4.886*
2.111 2.169 2.734 2.067 2.830 2.009
d (CDS) 7.563* 8.893** 3.944 4.947
† 3.500 4.091
3.416 3.289 2.459 2.797 2.565 2.632
d (price of commodities) -0.330
† -0.102 -0.142 -0.014 -0.157 -0.011
0.186 0.170 0.151 0.201 0.164 0.185
no. of observations 58 48 50 41 46 37
R2 0.436 0.486 0.316 0.362 0.321 0.359
RMSE 0.763 0.754 0.590 0.580 0.599 0.551
F / chi2 59.59** 56.88** 113.82** 5.62** 114.24** 92.14**
Note: Robust standard errors are reported. †, * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, 
respectively.
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